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THE EXISTING US Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) makes commercial-scale cellulosic 
ethanol a priority, calling for 16 billion 
gallons of cellulosic biofuel production 
by 2022, sourced from grasses, trees, 
agricultural residues, and municipal 
waste. The US Department of Energy 
“US Billion-Ton Update” study (Downing 
et al. 2011) suggests that to meet the 
mandates in the RFS, approximately 
66 million tons of corn stover may be 
needed annually. This equates to nearly 
50 percent of the total annual stover 
produced by Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, 
and Nebraska (Sesmero et al. 2015).  
Stover as an energy crop 
is appealing because the 
Midwest produces a lot of it; yet 
commercialization lags behind the 
progress made in other cellulosic 
crops for two signiϐicant reasons. First, 
stover is a crop residue with a high-
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degree of variability 
that impacts product 
quality and processing 
efϐiciency, and the 
most signiϐicant cost of 
production is storage 
and transport. Tackling 
the logistical challenges 
associated with storing 
and transporting 
stover and reducing the 
system costs occupies 
a substantial portion 
of the research efforts of agricultural 
and biosystems engineers working 
in renewable energy. Second, even as 
technological innovations advance, 
commercialization may lag due to 
farmer participation—cellulosic 
processors of stover for biofuel 
report producer participation rates of 
supplying stover are 20–25 percent, 
implying that the physical availability of 
the biomass crop is a poor metric for its 
supply in the cellulosic biofuel supply 
chain. If the industry is to achieve scale 
in cellulosic biofuel from crop residues, 
particularly stover, it will need to 
solve both of these issues. Beyond the 
technological capabilities, the solution is 
with procurement and pricing contracts.
From a production standpoint, stover 
is unique from other cellulosic biomass 
crops. It is a “second crop,” not a dedicated 
biomass source, and producers do not 
manage it for yield and quality as they do 
the primary crop, corn. Also, unlike how 
producers supply corn and other grains 
as a standardized commodity at a price 
revealed daily in the marketplace, stover 
is not commoditized and no active price 
discovery mechanisms exist. Producers 
commonly assign differential values to 
the stover based on their perception 
of its contribution to soil quality and 
productivity, whether collection and 
transport are likely to interfere with fall 
ϐield operations, and other factors. Thus, 
each stover supplier potentially has a 
unique reservation value at which s/he 
will participate in the stover supply chain.
On the other side of the transaction, 
the cellulosic biofuel processor 
attempting to procure biomass faces the 
challenge of writing contracts with the 
heterogeneous suppliers who produce 
stover. In addition, stover collection 
outcomes—the product quality 
characteristics—differ substantially 
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(increased participation) and are able 
to take advantage of location rents 
resulting from higher net prices (net 
of transportation) than they would 
receive under the processor-collection 
model. The same happens in the grain 
markets—farmers nearest to the 
delivery point have a higher net price 
than those further away who receive the 
same price per bushel. When processor-
collection is used, the processor cannot 
capture the supply efϐiciencies created 
through increased participation because 
all suppliers receive an identical ϐield-
side price, and it must offer a price 
based on capturing the feedstock 
supplied furthest from the plant. 
Simply put, a tradeoff exists between 
paying a higher price for feedstock to 
increase participation near the plant 
and accepting a greater procurement 
area (see also Rosburg, Miranowski, and 
Jacobs 2016). 
The third procurement option—
differentiated pricing—was evaluated 
alongside the other two options using 
simulations. The modeling assumptions 
were based on industry engineering 
and cost factors for a cellulosic ethanol 
facility requiring 300,000 metric tons 
of stover per year, and we include 
transportation costs of $0.65 per ton 
per mile. Table 1 shows, under varying 
degrees of price-responsiveness 
by stover suppliers, how feedstock 
collection distances from the plant, 
producer participation (supply), and 
feedstock per ton prices vary for a 
ϐixed plant to meet its feedstock needs. 
As producers become more price-
responsive, collection distances fall 
and per-ton feedstock prices increase, 
inducing greater participation in 
supplying feedstock. The processor-
collection and supplier-delivery 
models generate the same collection 
distances and total costs (not shown), 
but increased participation by suppliers 
closer to the plant increases the overall 
welfare to suppliers of stover. 
across ϐields, creating variability in the 
processor’s conversion process and 
adding to production costs. 
Pricing Challenge: What is an 
Optimal contract to Procure 
Stover as a Feedstock?
One procurement option is to offer all 
stover suppliers (farmers) a single price 
per ton for biomass delivered to the 
plant—this is analogous to how grain 
is priced and leaves transportation 
costs to the supplier. Alternatively, the 
processor contracts to collect the stover 
from ϐield-side locations, bearing the 
transportation costs and paying each 
supplier a uniform per-ton price. There 
are few examples in agriculture where 
this pricing and procurement option is 
used. Cellulosic processors using stover 
feedstock in the Midwest have used 
both procurement strategies, and in 
both cases, collection regions (distances 
in miles) were signiϐicantly larger—in 
some cases up to 75 miles to supply 
the plant—than anticipated due to low 
production participation. 
Processors have not uniformly 
adopted either the supplier-delivery 
pricing model, as is familiar to 
commodity producers, or a processor-
collection pricing model, which prevails 
in more specialized markets. This leaves 
open the issue of how procurement 
markets for stover biomass will emerge 
on a commercial scale and suggests a 
third contract option—differentiated 
pricing based on the supplier’s distance 
to the plant and reservation values. In 
other markets where there is a single 
buyer (seller) transacting with many 
sellers (buyers), differentiated pricing—
or price discrimination in the economics 
nomenclature—commonly emerges. 
Given that the market has not 
identiϐied a preferred pricing structure, 
the question remains, what is the 
optimal procurement and pricing model 
for this market? We used a simple 
theory of spatial price discrimination to 
answer this question, ϐirst comparing 
the supplier-delivery and processor-
collection models. Assuming that 
suppliers and processors face identical 
transportation costs, we ϐind that 
farmer (supplier) welfare is greatest 
under the supplier-delivery model 
compared with the processor-collection 
model, even though total feedstock 
collection expenditures and draw 
areas (distances) are identical. This 
is because when supplier-delivery 
procurement is used, farmers nearest 
the plant participate more intensely 
Table 1. Simulation Results Comparing Collection Distances, Supplier 
Participation and Prices for Three Pricing and Collection Mechanisms
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Perhaps the most significant result 
relative to understanding efficient 
contracting as a mechanism for 
commercialization is that, at all levels 
of price responsiveness, the collection 
distance to meet plant capacity is 
smallest when the processor is able to 
set differential prices with suppliers. 
In that case overall collection costs 
are reduced, and as a consequence, 
overall cellulosic ethanol production 
costs are lowest of the three options. 
The highlighted row represents 
the current participation rates 
and collection distances observed 
by processors, and suggests that 
improvements are possible using a 
price-differentiated approach. 
Figure 1 depicts hypothetical 
draw regions as they might exist in 
Iowa when there is no competition for 
stover (no overlap of stover collection 
areas by different processors), based 
on plant locations in central and north-
central Iowa and recently-experienced 
Figure 1. Illustration of simulation on stover collection areas under 
different pricing mechanisms.
producer participation outcomes. When 
processors are able to use differentiated 
price contracts, collection distances 
fall along with transportation costs, 
which are primary determinants of the 
economic feasibility of cellulosic ethanol 
from stover. 
These results are important 
to policy discussion surrounding 
the RFS, both in terms of relative 
feedstock use and costs and also with 
regard to the marketing mechanisms 
and contracts that may arise as 
the industry commercializes. From 
industry experiences, we know that 
the availability of a non-dedicated 
feedstock is not equal to supply and 
processors are drawing feedstock 
from significantly larger areas than 
early studies estimated would be 
needed based on stover production. 
It is likely that this market will 
continue to show low participation by 
suppliers if processors are compelled 
to use single-price contracts, which 
result in larger procurement 
regions and lower stover prices 
per ton. One solution to this is 
price differentiation based on 
a spatial factors (i.e., suppliers’ 
distances to the processor) and also 
stover-specific and field-specific 
characteristics that influence 
processing quality and quantity. 
As a consequence of the 
current procurement and pricing 
challenges to commercializing 
stover as feedstock, meeting the RFS 
mandate for cellulosic stocks will 
likely continue to require the use 
of feedstocks such as grasses and 
other “high-cost” feedstocks that 
were previously bid out of the early 
feedstock and supply cost models. 
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